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1 Introduction
Recently, there has been renewed interest in the business cycle properties of models with
search frictions and wage bargaining. Beginning with the seminal papers of Shimer (2005)
and Hall (2005), a growing body of literature examines the ability of Mortensen-Pissarides
search frictions to account for the cyclical variation of labor market variables. One striking
feature of this literature is that all models assume that labor supply is inelastic.
Several attempts have been made to calibrate Real Business Cycle models with labor
search frictions and labor supply which is elastic along the participation margin. However,
previous authors have been unable to match key qualitative facts on the cyclical behavior
of unemployment. Veracierto (2002), Tripier (2003) and Ravn (2006) all nd that their
models contradict the data by generating procyclical unemployment and a positively-
sloped Beveridge curve (a positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies).
This failure has limited the use of search frictions in business cycle models.
The di¢ culty is simple but vexing: In response to a positive shock, some agents
may wish to enter the labor market by commencing search, swelling the ranks of the
unemployed. If the ow of workers between non-participation and search is large enough,
then unemployment becomes procyclical and is positively correlated with the procyclical
vacancies.
How to solve this conundrum? On impact of a technology shock, vacancies and un-
employment both react positively. The key to ensuring that unemployment is counter-
cyclical is that vacancies react more strongly than unemployment, so that tightness and
job-nding rates increase on impact. When job-nding rates increase su¢ ciently, the
ows into unemployment from non-participation can be counterbalanced by ows out of
unemployment and into employment, guaranteeing that unemployment begins to drop
soon after impact. Hence, the challenge is to generate vacancies that are su¢ ciently re-
sponsive to productivity shocks, while also ensuring that unemployment does not respond
too strongly on impact.
This is reminiscent of the challenge posed by the Shimer puzzle. As noted by Shimer
(2005) and many others, generating enough responsiveness in vacancies on impact of a
productivity shock is important for generating su¢ cient volatility in vacancies and tight-
ness. Indeed, in order to solve the qualitative procyclical unemployment puzzle, it will
turn out to be important to address the quantitative Shimer puzzle. The converse of this
statement is that models which do not address the Shimer puzzle, generating counterfac-
tually low vacancy elasticities of productivity, will also tend to generate counterfactually
pro- or acyclical unemployment. In this sense, the glass is half empty: adding a partici-
pation margin can be seen as deepening the Shimer puzzle. In another sense, however,
the glass is half full: addressing the Shimer puzzle by whatever means one prefers will
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also help the model to generate strongly countercyclical unemployment. In this paper,
I will a employ a straightforward (albeit not uncontroversial) means of generating suf-
cient responsiveness of vacancies to productivity, namely the Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008) calibration strategy. Other means of generating su¢ cient vacancy elasticity of
productivity, such as those proposed by Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), should be easily
substitutable.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that a calibrated RBC model with
search frictions and a participation margin is indeed able to generate both highly coun-
tercyclical unemployment rates and a negative correlation between unemployment and
vacancies (a negatively sloped Beveridge curve). This model will also turn out to gener-
ate substantial volatility and elasticity to productivity in the key labor market variables
unemployment, vacancies and tightness. These qualitative and quantitative successes are
important, because only a model which matches key qualitative and quantitative facts
can be fruitfully used and developed further for theoretical and policy analysis.
The key to resurrecting the participation-search RBC model is a new calibration
strategy. First, Ravn (2006), Tripier (2003) and Veracierto (2002) all choose the elasticity
of labor supply to be either innite or to match the volatility of employment. In contrast,
I calibrate this elasticity to match the volatility of participation. In the body of the
paper, I will show that the two calibration strategies are not equivalent, and explain why
targetting the volatility of the participation rate is more appropriate.
This subtle but important di¤erence in calibration strategies turns out to be crucial.
The participation rate is only about 1/5 as volatile as GDP. The low volatility of the
participation rate requires that labor supply elasticity be su¢ ciently low, near unity. It
turns out that such a low labor supply elasticity implies that the ows of workers into
and out of the labor force in reaction to shocks are relatively small. This guarantees that
the response of unemployment on impact is relatively small. That labor supply elasticity
turns out to be so low is an attractive feature of this calibration. Micro studies typically
also nd low elasticities.
The second key element of the calibration strategy involves the response of wages to
productivity shocks. Parameters are chosen so that the wage elasticity of productivity
matches its value in the data, and so that the share of vacancy costs in national income
matches the data. These elements of the calibration strategy are due to Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008). Matching the cyclical variation in wages also helps in generating coun-
tercyclical unemployment rates and a negatively-sloped Beveridge curve. The reason is
that if wages react too strongly to productivity shocks, the incentives to create vacan-
cies are articially low. When vacancies do respond su¢ ciently to shocks,however, then
tightness and job-nding rates also react su¢ ciently so that the ows of workers out of
unemployment and into employment are large enough to mop upthe inows from non-
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participants. If job-nding rates increase su¢ ciently, then unemployment can begin to
drop again soon after the impact of a positive technology shock.
A further important element of the calibration strategy involves time aggregation. The
BLS measures unemployment by considering one reference week each month. Quarterly
data is obtained by averaging these monthly observations. Hence, it is possible that a
technology shock raises unemployment in the impact week or month, but that this is
subsequently reversed. As a result, the procyclical impact reaction of unemployment
would be washed out by subsequent countercyclical movements, so that unemployment is
countercyclical in the quarterly average. I will nd this to be the case, as demonstrated
by impulse-response functions of unemployment.
The calibrated RBC model with search frictions presented here can also be used
to gain a new perspective on the debate over whether or not Mortensen-Pissarides-style
serach frictions can account well for the cyclical variation in labor market variables. Using
di¤ering calibration strategies, Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) nd
that the stylized version of the Mortensen-Pissarides model can explain either practically
none or all of the cyclical variation in labor market variables, respectively.
The elastic labor supply model can only account for high volatility and elasticity to
productivity of tightness when the model is also able to generate a negatively-sloped Bev-
eridge curve. The reason is that a strong negative correlation between unemployment and
volatilities is required to ensure that their ratio uctuates su¢ ciently. Hence, targetting
participation volatility rather than employment volatility when choosing the participa-
tion elasticity is important in generating su¢ cient variation in tightness to match the
data.
To my knowledge, the only other paper which has been able to generate countercyclical
unemployment in RBC models with search frictions and elastic labor supply is Haefke and
Reiter (2006). They allow for heterogeneous productivity in home production, combined
with idiosyncratic productivity shocks. These two model elements also serve to restrict
the ow of workers into unemployment due to a positive technology shock. However, the
heterogeneity increases the complexity of their analysis considerably. In contrast, the
model presented in the present paper is a standard RBC model with search frictions, and
is highly tractable.
This paper also relates to an earlier literature which integrated search frictions into
business cycle models. Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) showed that business cy-
cle models with search frictions could be quite successful at accounting for the cyclical
properties of macro variables, as well as for the subset of the labor variables they consid-
ered. However, neither of these models allows for a participation margin. Merz (1995)
also encounters the di¢ culty of a positively-sloped Beveridge curve when allowing for
endogenous search intensity.
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model, whose equilibrium is
found in section 3. The calibration strategy is described in section 4, while quantitative
results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
This section presents the basic model. It is a standard real business cycle, augmented by
labor market frictions and wage bargaining. Labor supply is elastic along the extensive
(participation) margin. The bargaining setup involves rms bargaining individually with
each worker. Agents are risk averse. The agents are organized into large households which
provide full insurance against idiosyncratic consumption uctuations. The production
technology is Cobb-Douglas with labor and capital as inputs. This model can be seen as
the natural extension of the RBC literature to allow for search frictions and decentralized
wage bargaining. It is similar to the models studied in Ravn (2006), Veracierto (2002)
and Tripier (2004).
2.1 Households Problem
Each household consists of a number of individuals which is large enough to guarantee
perfect insurance over consumption. The household maximizes its discounted expected
utility over consumption of market goods ct and the fraction of non-participants lt. The
households Bellman equation is:
V (nt 1; kt 1) = max
ct;it;ut
fu (ct; lt) + EtV (nt; kt)g (1)
subject to the large-family budget, time and transition constraints
wtnt 1 + but + rtkt 1 + t  ct + it (2)
kt = (1  ) kt 1 + it (3)
1 = nt 1 + ut + lt (4)
nt = (1  )nt 1 + ftut (5)
The fraction nt 1 family members earn the wage wt, while ut are searching for work
and obtain benets b. The fraction lt of household members do not participate in the
labor market. The household owns the capital stock kt 1, which it rents at market rate
rt to rms. Due to search frictions in the labor market, the households date t stock
of employed workers nt 1 acts like a capital stock, which depreciates at the exogenous
separation rate . Households cannot choose employment directly. Instead, they can
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invest in employment by sending workers into search, understanding that date t searching
workers ut will nd jobs at (endogenous) rate ft.
The solution to the familys problem takes the form of two Euler equations, which are
derived in the Appendix.1 The rst is the standard Euler equation for consumption
1 = Et

uc;t+1
uc;t
[rt+1 + 1  ]

(6)
where uc;t  uc (ct; lt). The second Euler equation reects the households participation
decision
ul;t   buc;t = ftEt

wt+1uc;t+1   ul;t+1 + 1  
ft+1
[ul;t+1   buc;t+1]

(7)
The left-hand side of (7) reects the marginal disutility to increasing the familys labor
force participation, consisting of the loss in utility due to decreased lt net of the gain to an
increase in unemployment benets. The right hand side captures the discounted marginal
benet to employment, scaled by the endogenous rate at which searching workers nd
jobs ft.
2.2 Search and Matching in the Labor Market
The labor market is characterized by a standard search and matching framework. Ag-
gregate stocks of unemployed workers Ut and vacancies Vt are converted into job matches
by a constant returns to scale matching function m (Ut; Vt) = sU

t V
1 
t . Dening labor
market tightness as t  VtUt , the rm meets unemployed workers at rate qt = s
 
t , while
the unemployed workers meet vacancies at rate ft = s
1 
t . Aggregate employment Nt
evolves as
Nt = (1  )Nt 1 + ftUt (8)
where  is the exogenous match destruction rate.
Workers are identical and bargaining is individual. Dene et+1   uc;t+1uc;t to be the
householdsstochastic discount factor. The households surplus is derived in the Appendix
from its Bellman equation (1) as the marginal value to the household of an additional
employed worker2 Vn (nt 1; kt):
Vn;t = wtuc;t   buc;t + (1    ft) Et [Vn;t+1] (9)
Finally, workers surplus in utility terms (9) can be converted into units of the good by
1Both the households optimization problem and its solution are very similar to those analyzed in
Ravn (2006).
2The derivation of surplus is similar to that in Ravn (2006) or Trigari (2006).
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dividing by the marginal utility of consumption uc;t:
Vn;t
uc;t
= wt   b+ (1    ft)Et
et+1Vn;t+1uc;t+1

(10)
2.3 Firms Problem
There is a continuum of identical rms on the unit interval. Firms are perfectly compet-
itive and produce using a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology.
Firms maximize the discounted value of future prots. Firms produce using labor and
rented capital. Firms adjust employment by varying the number of workers rather than
the number of hours per worker. This is the appropriate margin, since about 2/3 of the
uctuations in employment can be attributed to the extensive margin.3
Firms face search frictions in the labor market, so that they cannot adjust employment
in the current period. Employment is a state variable, and behaves much as a capital
stock. Firms can add to their future stock of employment capital by investing in current
vacancies vt, which are transformed into employed workers next period at the endogenous
job-lling rate qt. The rms Bellman equation is:
J (nt 1; zt) = max
vt;kt 1
n
yt   wtnt 1   rtkt 1   vt + Et
het+1J (nt; zt+1)io (11)
subject to
production function : yt = Aztn1 t 1 k

t 1 (12)
transition function : nt = (1  )nt 1 + qtvt (13)
technology shock : ln zt =  ln zt 1 + "t (14)
It is straightforward to derive the following conditions for the rms optimal factor
choices:
rt = 
yt
kt 1
(15)

qt
= Et
et+1 (1  ) yt+1nt   wt+1 + (1  ) qt+1

(16)
In addition, it is useful to note that the rms surplus under individual bargaining can
be obtained from the envelope condition of the rms problem
Jn;t = (1  ) yt
nt 1
  wt + (1  ) 
qt
(17)
3cf. Hansen (1985), whose results can also be replicated with more recent data.
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2.4 Individual Wage Bargaining
The key assumption of the individual bargaining framework is that rms cannot commit
to long-term employment contracts, and may renegotiate wages with each worker at any
time. This makes each worker e¤ectively the marginal worker.4 Hence, the rms outside
option is not remaining idle, but rather producing with one worker less, so that rms
surplus is the marginal value of a worker.
Individual bargaining is the appropriate bargaining setup when studying the business
cycle properties of the US economy. "Employment at will" is dominant in US labor mar-
kets. Under employment at will, both rms and workers can terminate the employment
relationship at any time, without justication.
The individual Nash bargaining problem maximizes the weighted sum of log surpluses
max
wt
 ln
Vn;t
uc;t
+ (1  ) ln Jn;t (18)
subject to rm surplus (17) and workers surplus (10). Workers bargaining power is given
by .
Proposition 1 The solution to the bargaining problem (18) subject to (17)
and (10) is given by
wt = (1  ) b+ 

(1  ) yt
nt 1
+ t

(19)
Proof See the appendix.
Equation (19) is the wage curve.
3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is dened as sequences of prices and labor market tightnesses which solve
the rms, the households and the bargaining problems and which let markets clear. The
solution satisifes the households Euler equations (6) and (7), the household constraints
(2)-(5), the rms optimality conditions (15) and (16), the wage curve (19), the transition
equation for aggregate unemployment (8) and appropriate market-clearing conditions.
This denition of equilibrium yields a system of fourteen equations in the fourteen
unknowns (nt; lt; kt; ft; qt; t; ut; vt; wt; yt; ct; it; rt; zt). The log-linearized system is solved
by the method of undetermined coe¢ cients, implemented using Uhligs toolkit.
4The individual bargaining framework was introduced by Stole and Zwiebel (1996).
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4 Calibration
The specication of the utility function is standard:
u (ct; lt) = ln ct + 
l
1  1

t
1  1

so that  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for leisure.
Period length is one week. There are fourteen parameters to pin down: the technology
parameter A, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution over time use , the weight on
non-participantstime in the utility function , the matching elasticity , vacancy costs
, workers bargaining power , the output elasticity of capital , the utility coe¢ cient on
unemployment b, the depreciation rate , the match destruction rate , and the matching
scale parameter s, the discount factor  and the two parameters of the productivity shock
 and ".
I consider four calibrations. The choices for the subset of parameters (A; ; ; ; ; s; ; ; ")
are common to all of these and are reported in Table 1a. The technology parameter A
is normalized to one. The parameters of the weekly log productivity process are chosen
to match the autocorrelation and volatility of output per worker in post-war quarterly
US data. Choosing weekly autocorrelation w = 0:9895 and weekly standard deviation of
the innovation ";w = 0:34 % leads to quarterly autocorrelation q = 0:765 and quarterly
unconditional volatility z;q = 1:3 %.5 Matching elasticity  is set to 0:50, within the
range reported in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). The discount factor  is chosen to
match an annual risk-free rate of 4%. The depreciation rate for capital is chosen so that
the investment share of income i
y
= 0:25, its value in the post-war data reported by
Francis and Ramey (2001). The weekly calibrated value of  = 0:0022 corresponds to an
annual depreciation rate of 10:0%. The weekly separation rate  is set to 0:0081, which
corresponds to the monthly rate of  = 0:026 estimated by Shimer (2005). Similarly, the
target for the weekly job-nding rate f is 0.139, which corresponds to Shimer (2005)s
monthly value of 0.45. Together  and f pin down the equilibrium unemployment rate
u
u+n
at 5.5 %. The target for the job-lling rate q is that of Den Haan, Ramey and
Watson (2000), who nd q to be 0.71 monthly, corresponding to a weekly value of 0.266.
Together, the targets for f and q pin down the steady-state labor market tightness as
 = f
q
= 0:523.6 The latter gure is in roughly line with the average tightness value in the
data of 0.465, obtained using JOLTS data for December 2000 to June 2007. Together,
5These values are identical to those chosen in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
6At monthly frequency, the tightness target is  = fmqm = 0:634, which corresponds to the monthly
target in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Labor market tightness is not invariant to frequency when
calculated as  = fq . The reason is that the weekly job-nding rate fw is obtained from the monthly rate
fm as 1 fw = (1  fm)
1
4 . Analogously, the weekly job-lling rate qw is the solution to 1 qw = (1  qm)
1
4 .
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the targets for q and f also pin down the scaling parameter of the matching function,
which becomes s = 0:175:
The target for the labor share is n = 0:64, as implied by national accounts data.
Factor shares add up to one, so that n+k +v = 1, where v is the share of vacancy
costs in national income. The capital elasticity of output  is determined as k = .
4.1 Baseline
The baseline calibration is summarized in Table 1a. The key element of the baseline
calibration strategy is the use of the cyclical variation in the participation rate to pin
down the elasticity of labor supply . This is a novel calibration strategy, and plays an
important role in establishing the models ability to generate countercyclical unemploy-
ment rates and a negatively sloped Beveridge curve, despite the presence of elastic labor
supply along the participation margin. Otherwise, the calibration is similar to that of
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
I follow Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) in estimating that hiring a worker costs 7.6
% of the workers annual wage7. This yields a share of vacancy costs in national income of
v = 1:57%
8. v = q
n
y
pins down vacancy posting costs 9. Next, workers bargaining
power  is chosen so that wages respond to technology shocks in a way that matches
the data. The baseline calibration targets the point estimate of the wage elasticity of
labor productivity reported by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), "w;z = 0:449. Choosing
 = 0:103 achieves this target, and leads to a relative volatility of wages to output
w=y =
w
y
= 0:424, very close to the value of 0.42 from the data. The models value for
"w;z is also within about one standard error of the point estimates reported in Haefke, et.
al. (2007).10
As a result,
w =
fw
qw
=
1  (1  fm)
1
4
1  (1  qm)
1
4
which is clearly distinct from m =
fm
qm
.
7In Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), labor costs are 4.5% of quarterly wages, corresponding to 1.1 %
of annual wages, while capital costs are 6.5 % of annual wages.
8If hiring a worker costs 0.076 of annual wages, then q = 0:076  wA. The income share becomes:
v = 
v
yA
= A 

q
n
yA
= A  0:076 n
Using that A = 1   (1  W )48 = 0:323 is the annual probability of being separated, and that labour
share of income is 0.64 yields v = 1:57 %.
9Note that ny is pinned down by
y
n = A
k
n

, where capital intensity comes from the consumption Euler
equation in the steady state: kn =
 
A
r
1=(1 )
.
10Haefke, et. al. (2007) use CPS data on job-movers and nd an OLS point estimate of "w;z = 0:94
with a standard error of 0:44. When controlling for the di¤ering industry composition of new jobs versus
all jobs, the OLS point estimate drops to 0:73 with a standard error of 0:48. Hagedorn and Manovskii
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Now, one can use the steady-state versions of labor demand (16) and the wage curve
(19) to obtain an equation which relates the benet to unemployment b to parameters
and steady-state tightness  (recall that  was pinned down by targets for f and q):
b = (1  ) y
n
  
1    
1
1  

q
(r + )
Finally, the utility parameters  and  remain to be set. The weight on utility
from the non-participants  is chosen so that the steady-state fraction 1   l of family
members who participate in the labor market matches the average rate of labor market
participation in the US from 1964 to 2006 at 64%. Setting  = 0:516 achieves this
target. The participation elasticity  is set so that the volatility of the participation rate
matches the data. Targetting a relative volatility of participation of p=y = 0:20 results
in an intertemporal elasticity of substitution over time use of  = 1:045. One can read
the corresponding partial elasticity of participation with respect to technology shocks
o¤ the models recursive law of motion. In the baseline model a 1% increase in TFP
leads to a 0.285 % increase in labor force participation. This is in line with numerous
microeconometric estimates for labor supply elasticity which are smaller than unity11.
4.2 Hagedorn/Manovskii, Target n=y
Next, I also examine a calibration which di¤ers from the baseline only in its calibration
strategy for labor supply elasticity . Rather than targetting participation volatility, this
alternative targets employment volatility, as in the work of previous authors. A much
higher value of  = 4:9 is needed to ensure that employment is about 60% as volatile as
output.
4.3 Traditional
Results from traditional calibrations are reported in Table 1b. The traditional calibra-
tions choose bargaining power  and the replacement rate b=w in the standard way, as
advocated by Shimer (2005). Now,  =  = 0:50, so that the Hosios condition is sat-
ised12. The replacement rate is set at b
w
= 0:40. This implies a value of  = 6:69 for
vacancy costs, leading to a higher share of vacancy costs in national income than in the
baseline calibration of v = 2:07. The weight on leisure in utility  is again chosen so
that in steady-state, 64% of agents participate in the labor market. A value of  = 0:27
achieves this target.
(2008) use PSID data and obtain a point estimate of "w;z = 0:449 with a standard error of 0:042.
11In principle, one could also use microeconometric estimates of partcipation elasticity as calibration
targets.
12Shimer (2005) actually uses  =  = 0:72, but most of the literature takes  =  = 0:50.
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I examine two versions of the traditional calibration, which di¤er only in the choice
of target for labor supply elasticity, . When the target is participation volatility, as in
the baseline, a low value of  = 0:63 is required to ensure that participation is one-fth
as volatile as output. When the target is employment volatility, as in previous authors
work, a high value of  = 5:04 yields employment that is about 60% as volatile as output.
5 Results
Results of the baseline calibration are presented in Table 2. The results of the weekly
calibration have been aggregated to a quarterly frequency, so that they can be compared
to the quarterly data. In what follows, I will rst discuss the models success at gen-
erating countercyclical unemployment and a negatively sloped Beveridge curve despite
labor supply which is elastic along the extensive margin. Next, the impact of elastic labor
supply on the ability of the model to account for the volatility of labor market variables
over the cycle is discussed.
5.1 Countercyclical Unemployment
The baseline calibration generates unemployment which is nearly as countercyclical as in
the data, model (u; y) =  0:82 versus data (u; y) =  0:88. It also generates a negatively
sloped Beveridge curve, although the contemporaneous correlation between unemploy-
ment and vacancies model (u; v) =  0:43 falls somewhat short of its value in the data
data (u; v) =  0:97. The mere fact that model unemployment is strongly countercyclical
and the model Beveridge curve negatively sloped is surprising. Previous authors study-
ing RBC models with search frictions and elastic labor supply along the participation
margin (Veracierto (2002), Tripier (2003) and Ravn (2005)) have consistently found their
models to generate procyclical unemployment and a positively sloped Beveridge curve,
contradicting the stylized facts.
The model presented here succeeds for two reasons: the calibration strategy and time
aggregation. In what follows, I discuss each of these factors in detail.
5.1.1 Targetting Participation Volatility
The rst reason that the model presented here succeeds at generating countercyclical
unemployment and a negatively-sloped Beveridge curve is the calibration strategy for
the labor supply elasticity. In the baseline calibration, I choose  so as to match the
relative volatility of the participation rate p=y = 0:20, leading to a moderate degree of
participation elasticity  in the baseline model, namely 1:045. In contrast, Veracierto
(2002), Tripier (2003) and Ravn (2006) have all chosen higher values for . Ravn (2006)
11
focuses on utility functions that are linear in leisure, and hence are characterized by
innitely elastic labor supplies. Veracierto (2002) calibrates  to match the volatility
of employment rather than participation, resulting in a more elastic labor supply in his
model.13 Table 2 compares the results of the baseline calibration, in which  is chosen
to match participation volatility, with the results of an otherwise identical calibration in
which  is chosen to match employment volatility. Targetting n=y leads to a much higher
value for  of nearly 5. Clearly, the high labor supply elasticity version fails badly at
matching the key correlations of unemployment with output, vacancies and employment.
It generates unemployment which is slightly procyclical, and a strongly positively sloped
Beveridge curve, both in marked contrast to the strongly countercyclical unemployment
and strongly negatively sloped Beveridge curve in the data.
Why does the low labor supply elasticity implied by targetting p=y help to gener-
ate countercyclical unemployment and a negatively-sloped Beveridge curve? To see this,
compare impulse-response functions for the low-elasticity scenario (targetting p=y) and
and the high-elasticity scenario (targetting n=y), shown in Figures 1 and 2 respectively.
When participation is very elastic, the response of unemployment to a technology shock
is large and positive on impact, as agents respond to the increased wages and increased
probability of job-nding by streaming into search (unemployment). When participation
is less elastic, the initial impact of a technology shock on unemployment is still positive,
but smaller, because of agentslower willingness to substitute over time uses, putting a
brake on the ows into search. As a result of the small increase in unemployment, com-
bined with a strong increase in vacancies, tightness and hence job-nding rates increase
strongly in Figure 1. The increased job-nding rates ensure that the inows of search-
ing workers are mopped upquickly and transit into employment, so that net inows
of workers to unemployment become negative within one month. In addition, the quick
reversal of unemployments behavior, coupled with an increase in tightness, help keep the
Beveridge curve negatively sloped.
In contrast, in the high labor supply elasticity scenario of Figure 2, ows into un-
employment upon impact are nearly has high as the increases in vacancies. As a result,
tightness and job-nding rates do not increase much, so that job-seekers transit to employ-
ment at a lower rate. It then takes nearly half a year for the inows into unemployment
to become negative. Not only does this lead to procyclical unemployment, but the strong
correlation between unemployment and vacancies leads to a strongly positively-sloped
Beveridge curve.
Another way of seeing why the di¤erence between targeting participation and em-
ployment volatility is important is by doing a bit of volatility accounting. First, note
13Tripier (2003) reports results to one calibration in which labor supply is innitely elastic, and one
in which he chooses labor supply elasticity to match employment volatility, as in Veracierto (2002).
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that participation pt is equal to the sum of employment ht and unemployment ut.14 As
a result, the variance of the participation rate is given as
p22p = u
22u + h
22h + 2hu  cov
but;bht
Matching the volatility of the participation rate p would only be equivalent to match-
ing the volatility of employment h if both models generated the same unemployment
volatility u and the same covariance of unemployment and employment cov
but;bht.
Otherwise, the two calibration strategies yield di¤erent results.
The volatilities of unemployment generated by the alternative participation and em-
ployment volatility targets are reasonably similar and roughly in line with the data (de-
tails further below). However, the correlation between unemployment and employment
generated by the two targets varies considerably. In the data, this correlation is strongly
negative at u;h =  0:95. Figure 3 shows that targetting participation rate volatility leads
to almost as strong a negative correlation between unemployment and employment, as in
the data (u;h (model) =  0:89). In contrast, targetting employment volatility causes un-
employment and employment to be somewhat positively correlated in the model. Hence,
targetting the employment volatility is equivalent to targeting much too high a volatility
in the participation rate. Indeed, Veracierto (2002) also nds that his model generates
volatility of the participation rate that is nearly three times as large as that observed
in the data.15 Figure 4 shows how the key correlations with unemployment vary with
participation volatility.
In addition, participation volatility p is much more sensitive to labor supply elas-
ticity  than employment volatility h, as can be seen from Figure 5. This implies that
calibrating to p leads to a smaller deviation from n than vice-versa.
5.1.2 Wage Elasticity
A second important element of the calibration strategy is the wage elasticity of productiv-
ity. This elasticity is important in respect to its ability to generate vacancies which react
strongly enough to productivity shocks. Recalling the impulse-response functions dis-
cussed in the previous subsection, the key to generating countercyclical unemployment is
that vacancies react more strongly than unemployment on impact of a technology shock,
so that tightness increases. Only if tightness increases do job-nding rates increase, so
that the ows into search can be counterbalanced by ows out of search and into employ-
14In the log-linearized model, this corresponds to pbpt = ubut + hbht, where p is the steady-state partici-
pation rate and bpt is the log-deviation.
15Here, I refer to Table 6 in Veracierto (2002), which gives the results of the Mortensen-Pissarides
search model.
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ment.
Figure 6 examines the impact of increasing the implied wage elasticity of productivity
in the model on key variables.16 The model wage elasticity of productivity "w;z can be
increased quite substantially from its baseline value of 0.449 to about 0.70, while still
generating strongly countercyclical unemployment, a strong negative correlation between
unemployment and employment, and a (slightly) negatively sloped Beveridge curve. As
"w;z approaches 1, however, model performance deteriorates.
Another way of examining the role of wage elasticity is to compare the results from the
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)-style baseline calibrations to the traditional calibrations.
The main distinction between these two sets of calibrations is the implied wage elasticity
of productivity, which approaches unity in the traditional calibrations. From the results
reported in Table 2, one can see that neither traditional calibration is able to generate
enough countercyclical movement in unemployment or a negatively sloped Beveridge
curve. The traditional calibration which targets participation volatility does perform
somewhat better, leading to somewhat countercyclical unemployment with  (u; y) =
 0:22.
5.1.3 Time Aggregation
Another reason that our model succeeds at generating realistic behavior of unemployment
has to do with time aggregation and data collection. The BLS samples unemployment
and vacancies for one reference week each month.17 That is, subjects are asked whether
they were searching for work not during the entire month, but only during the reference
week. As a result, it is possible that a worker enters the labor force between reference
weeks, searches for up to 3 weeks, nds a job, and is never recorded as unemployed. This
is especially relevant in good times, when job-nding rates are high.18
In addition, since productivity data is available quarterly, one can only assess the
cyclical behavior of unemployment at a quarterly frequency. The quarterly data is ob-
tained as an average of monthly values. Hence, a small upward tick in unemployment
on impact of a positive technology shock would be averaged with the lagged downward
movements in unemployment. As a result, the average unemployment rate over the quar-
ter might respond negatively to a positive productivity shock, despite an uptick in the
impact month.
To address these issues, I calibrate the model to weekly data, aggregate the results to a
quarterly frequency by taking averages, HP-lter the quarterly series, and then calculate
16Figure 6 was generated by increasing workers bargaining power and abandoning the target w=y =
0:42, while maintaining all other calibration targets.
17I refer here to collection procedures for the Current Population Survey, described on the BLS website
under www.bls.gov/cps/cps_htgm.htm.
18Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) make a very similar point, and also implement a weekly calibration.
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the correlations and the standard deviations. Table 3 compares the weekly results to the
results of equivalent quarterly calibrations. While the frequency of the calibration does
not have much impact on results under the employment volatility target, it is important
under the participation volatility target. The reason is simple. The quarterly impulse-
responses of Figure 7 show that vacancies, unemployment, tightness and job-nding rates
react in fundamentally the same way as in the weekly calibration. The impact of a positive
technology shock is greater on vacancies than on unemployment, so that tightness and
job-nding rates increase on impact. As a result, enough searchers nd jobs immediately,
and unemployment already begins to decline one quarter after impact. Although the
contemporaneous quarterly correlation between GDP and unemployment is of relatively
small magnitude at  0:21, the lagged quarterly correlation between yt and ut+1 is highly
negative at  0:83. Aggregating up to a biannual or annual frequency would cause the
positive impact of technology on unemployment to be reversed, in the same way that
aggregating from weekly to quarterly did.
5.2 Volatilities of Unemployment and Vacancies
Finally, I discuss the ability of the model to account for the volatilities of labor mar-
ket variables over the cycle. In a framework with inelastic labor supply, Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) are able to match the raw volatilities of unemployment, vacancies and
tightness relative to productivity reported in Table 4. Elastic labor supply makes it more
di¢ cult for the model to generate highly volatile labor market variables. The quantita-
tive question is: How much of the volatility of labor market variables in the data can be
accounted for by a full RBC model with elastic labor supply?
Results on the cyclicality of labor market variables in the baseline calibration are
presented in Tables 5 and 6. Even the moderate degree of labor supply elasticity in the
baseline calibration does decrease the ability of Mortensen-Pissarides search frictions to
match the raw volatilities of unemployment and vacancies noticeably. Still, the model
with elastic labor supply is able to account for nearly 80% of the relative volatility of
vacancies, while generating about 60% as much volatility in unemployment as in the data.
Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) and Pissarides (2007) argue that it is more appro-
priate to convert the raw volatilities into elasticities, to account for the fact that labor
productivity is not the only source of cyclical variation. In the data, the elasticity of a
labor market variable x with respect to labor productivity p is obtained as "x;p = xp x;p.
In the model, I obtain estimates for "x;p by regressing the relevant labor market variable
x on labor productivity, dened as output per worker. The results are presented in Table
6.
The baseline calibration of the elastic labor supply RBC model with search frictions
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leads to an elasticity of unemployment with respect to productivity of "u;p =  3:44,
which quite close to that the estimate from the data of  3:88. The models estimate of
the elasticity of vacancies with respect to productivity even overshoots the value in the
data, at "v;p = 5:51 versus the data value of 3.68.19
How well the elastic labor supply model does at accounting for the elasticity of tight-
ness to productivity depends crucially on the calibration target for . When the preferred
participation volatility target is used, the model generates a somewhat higher elasticity
of tightness in the model at ";p = 8:95 than in the data at 7.56. When the employment
volatility target is used, however, the model generated elasticity of tightness is much too
low at ";p = 1:19. The reason is that the participation target ensures that unemployment
and vacancies are negatively correlated, which of course leads to greater variation in their
ratio.
Interestingly, the employment target also leads to much lower elasticities of unemploy-
ment and vacancies with respect to productivity. Nonetheless, the employment target
calibration is indeed able to generate signicant volatility in u and v: unemployment is
about 6.9 times as volatile as productivity, while vacancies are about 7.5 times as volatile
as productivity. This is mainly due to the low correlation between productivity and these
labor market variables ( (u; p) = 0:14 and  (v; p) = 0:36)20.
6 Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that a business cycle model with
labor search frictions and a participation margin can indeed give qualitatively and quan-
titatively sensible results. The calibrated model succeeds at generating countercyclical
unemployment and a negatively-sloped Beveridge curve, despite the presence of elastic
labor supply along the extensive (participation) margin. The key to success is a cali-
bration strategy that chooses participation elasticity so as to match the volatility of the
participation rate and that uses a small surplus calibration to ensure that vacancies are
su¢ ciently responsive to productivity shocks.
19Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)s inelastic labor supply model overshoots even more strongly on
these elasticities, as noted in Mortensen and Nagypal (2007).
20Recall that the elasticity is the product of the relative volatility and the correlation with productivity,
"x;p =
x
p
 (x; p).
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Table 1a
Baseline Calibration Weekly
Parameter Value Target
A 1.0 normalization
 0.9895 data
" 0.34 data
 0.50 data
 0.0081 data
 0.991=12 er = 4:0 % ann
 0.0022 i
y
= 0:25
 0.344 k = 0:344
s 0.175 f = 0:139
 0.516 l = 0:64

1.045
4.9
p=y = 0:20
n=y = 0:60
 0.103 "w;z = 0:449
 5.08 v = 0:0157
b
w
0.949 q = 0:266
Table 1b
Traditional Calibration Weekly
Parameter Value Target
 0.27 l = 0:64

0.63
5.04
p=y = 0:20
n=y = 0:60
 6.69 b
w
= 0:40
 0.50 Hosios  = 
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Table 2
Baseline Results
x  (y; u)  (v; u)  (n; u)
Data  0.88  0.97  0.95
Model Baseline  0.82  0.43  0.89
HM, target n=y 0.02 0.98  0.01
trad, target n=y  0.01 0.96  0.04
trad, target p=y  0.22 0.64  0.36
Correlations are based upon quarterly BLS data from 1964 Q1-2005 Q4 which
has been HP-ltered using Ravn and Uhlig (2004)s optimal parameter value for
quarterly data of 1600.
Table 3
Weekly vs Quarterly
x  (y; u)  (v; u)  (n; u)
Data  0.88  0.97  0.95
Model Baseline weekly  0.82  0.43  0.89
quarterly  0.15 0.68 0.00
trad, target p=y weekly  0.22 0.64  0.36
quarterly 0.19 0.95 0.29
HM, target n=y weekly 0.02 0.98  0.01
quarterly 0.05 0.99 0.39
trad, target n=y weekly  0.01 0.96  0.04
quarterly 0.09 1.00 0.42
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Table 4
Shimers summary statistics, quarterly US data, 1951-2003
x u v v=u f p
Standard deviation 0.190 0.202 0.382 0.118 0.020
Relative Std. deviation x
p
9.5 10.1 19.1 5.9 1.0
Autocorrelation 0.936 0.940 0.941 0.908 0.878
Correlation matrix u 1  0.894  0.971  0.949  0.408
v  1 0.975 0.897 0.364
v=u   1 0.948 0.396
f    1 0.396
p     1
All variables reported are log deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter
105. Source: Shimer (2005, Table 1), augmented by own calculations of the relative
standard deviations x
p
.
Table 5
Baseline Results
x u v v=u f p
Relative Std deviation x
p
5.6 7.9 11.5 5.6 1.0
Autocorrelation 0.75 0.52 0.76 0.77 0.75
Correlation matrix u 1  0.43  0.78  0.78  0.73
v  1 0.90 0.90 0.92
v=u   1 1.00 0.99
f    1 0.99
p     1
All variables reported are log deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter
105.
Table 6
Elasticities of Labor Market Variables
"u;p "v;p ";p
Data  3.88 3.68 7.56
Baseline  3.44 5.51 8.95
HM, target n=y 0.42 1.61 1.19
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Figure 1: Low participation elasticity scenario,  = 1:045 to match participation
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Figure 4: Sensitivity of unemployment correlations to targetted p=y. Weekly
calibration, all remaining calibration targets maintained.
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Figure 6: Sensitivity of unemployment correlations to targetted p=y. Weekly cali-
bration, all remaining calibration targets maintained.
22
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Impulse responses to a 1% shock in technology: Targetsp, Quarterly
Years after shock
P
er
ce
nt
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
Tightness q
Unemployment u
Vacancies v
Job Finding f
Figure 7: Quarterly impulse responses, low participation elasticity scenario,  chosen to
match participation volatility p=y = 0:20.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Sensitivity of Labor Market Volatilities to Target Value forsp/y
Participation Volatilitysp
R
el
at
iv
e 
V
ol
at
ili
tie
s
Tightness
Unemployment
Vacancies
Figure 8: Sensitivity of volatilities of key labor market variables to the targetted
participation volatility p=y. Weekly calibration, all remaining calibration targets
maintained.
23
Appendices
A Solving the Households Optimization Problem
The households optimization problem is given by (1) subject to (2)-(5). Substituting the
constraints into (1) yields
V (nt 1; kt 1) = max
ct;it;ut
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
u
24ct; 1  nt 1   ut| {z }
lt
35
+EtV
24(1  )nt 1 + ftut| {z }
nt
; (1  ) kt 1 + it| {z }
kt
35
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
(20)
subject to
wtnt 1 + but + rtkt 1 + t  ct + it (21)
The rst order conditions are
FOC ct : uc (ct; lt) = t (22)
FOC ut : ul (ct; lt) = bt + ftEt [Vn (nt; kt)] (23)
FOC it : Et [Vk (nt; kt)] = t (24)
where t is the multiplier on the budget constraint (21). The envelope conditions for the
two state variables nt 1 and kt 1 are:
Vn (nt 1; kt 1) = wtt   ul (ct; lt) + (1  ) Et [Vn (nt; kt)] (25)
Vk (nt 1; kt 1) = (1  ) Et [Vk (nt; kt)] + trt (26)
Substituting (22) and (23) into the envelope for nt 1 yields (7). Substituting (22) and
(24) into (26) yields (6).
B Deriving Workers Surplus
The marginal value to the household of an additional employed worker at date t is given
by the envelope condition (25)
Vn;t = wtuc;t   ul;t + (1  ) Et [Vn;t+1]
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where Vn;t  Vn (nt 1; kt 1) and the rst order condition (22) has been used to substitute
out for t. Similarly, the marginal value to the household of an additional unemployed
worker at date t is given by the households rst order condition for ut (23)
Vu;t =  ul;t + buc;t + ftEt [Vn;t+1] = 0
As a result, the households surplus to employment is
Vn;t   Vu;t = wtuc;t   buc;t + (1    ft) Et [Vn;t+1]
Using that at the optimum Vu;t = 0 yields (9).
C Deriving the Wage Curve
Proof of Proposition 1: The rst order condition of the bargaining problem (18) subject
to (17) and (10) is:
Vn;t
uc;t
=

1  Jn;t (27)
Substitute into (27) from (17) to obtain
Vn;t
uc;t
=

1  

(1  ) yt
nt 1
  wt + (1  ) 
qt

(28)
Now taking (28) ahead one period and multiplying both sides by et+1 yields a closed form
expression for future workers surplus:
Et
et+1Vn;t+1uc;t+1

=

1  Et
et+1 (1  ) yt+1nt   wt+1 + (1  ) qt+1

(29)
Next, can use rms optimality condition for labor (16) to obtain
Et
et+1Vn;t+1uc;t+1

=

1  

qt
(30)
Future surplus depends only upon aggregate variables. The reason is that the expected
workers surplus is a search rent, whose value depends only upon the cost of searching for
a new worker 
qt
. Finally, substitute (10), (17) and (30) into the wage bargain (27) to
obtain the wage curve (19). Q.E.D.
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